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Abstract
Periodic inspections, in which firms are punished for detected violations, are a popular
means of enforcing environmental, health, and safety regulations. The effectiveness of
these programs typically hinges on the timing of inspections being unannounced and
difficult to anticipate, lest firms comply only when they believe inspections are likely.
In Las Vegas, Nevada, many facilities—e.g., casinos, hotels, and shopping malls—
house multiple food-service establishments, several of which are often inspected during
the same inspector visit. Within such visits, all but the first establishment inspected
likely anticipate their next inspection to a meaningful extent. Using data which record
inspection starting times and span more than six years, I find that establishments in
such facilities perform significantly and substantially worse when they receive the first
inspection of a visit. Relative to their own performances on days when inspected later
than first, establishments are assessed 21% more demerits and cited for 31% more
critical violations in these surprise inspections.
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1 Introduction
Periodic inspections, in which firms are punished for detected violations, are widespread in
the monitoring and enforcement of environmental, health, and safety regulations. Inspec-
tion programs promote compliance by generating an expected cost to regulatory violations:
the penalty assessed if the violation is detected, multiplied by the current probability of
inspection and subsequent detection. This approach, which is often central to the provision
of environmental quality and public safety, hinges on inspections being unannounced and
difficult to anticipate. For if firms can correctly predict when their inspection probabilities
are low, much of the expected cost will be mitigated.
Regulatory agencies, and the governments funding them, confront a tradeoff: limiting
the ability of firms to anticipate inspections promotes compliance, but is also costly.1 As
such, the sensitivity of compliance to the ability to anticipate inspections is fundamental
to understanding the optimal design, implementation, and funding of inspection programs.
This sensitivity is also, however, difficult to cleanly estimate. Exploiting a feature of food-
service health inspections in the Las Vegas, Nevada, metropolitan area; I circumvent typical
complications and find that a modest ability to anticipate inspections can significantly un-
dermine the monitoring and enforcement efforts of inspection programs.
Accounting for firms’ abilities to anticipate inspections—and more generally, their per-
ceptions of inspection probabilities and regulatory stringency—poses an empirical challenge.2
Gray and Deily (1996), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Eckert (2004), and Telle (2009), esti-
mate the effect of perceived inspection probabilities on observed compliance using a two-step
approach. First, inspection probabilities are estimated for different time periods using firm
observables. Then, compliance outcomes are estimated as functions of predicted probabil-
1For instance, a measure such as increasing the frequency of inspections, cet. par., likely requires the
hiring of additional inspectors.
2Gray and Shimshack (2011) discuss these challenges, and provide a thorough review of empirical evidence
regarding the effects of monitoring and enforcement effort on compliance.
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ities from the first step, which proxy for firms’ perceptions.3 More recently, Duflo et al.
(2018) assess experimental variation in the frequency of environmental inspections of Indian
factories. They find that plants treated with increased inspection frequency were more likely
to be cited for violating emissions standards.
Instead of proxying for firm perceptions, I utilize a feature of Southern Nevada Health
District (SNHD) food-service health inspections that creates sharp within-firm variation in
the ability to anticipate inspection timing. The Las Vegas metropolitan area is home to
many facilities—particularly casinos, hotels, and shopping malls—that house more than one
food-service establishment. SNHD environmental health specialists (inspectors) will com-
monly inspect multiple establishments during a single visit to these facilities. When this
happens, all except the first establishment inspected likely anticipate their next inspection
to a meaningful extent.
Using rich data on SNHD food-service inspections conducted from 2014 to 2020, I find
that: compared to visits in which they are inspected after another establishment at their
facility, restaurants perform significantly and substantially worse during visits when they
receive their facility’s first inspection. Relative to instances where ability to anticipate in-
spections is elevated, restaurants are assessed 20.82 percent more demerits, and are cited
for 30.96 percent more critical violations (among the most severe violations defined by the
SNHD) when inspected first during a visit. Moreover, consistent with the assumption under-
lying this empirical strategy, the effect of being inspected first on detected non-compliance is
concentrated among violations capable of relatively quick remedy. A series of tests suggest
that the results are not artifacts of endogenous inspection ordering, repeat visits by the same
inspector, or inspector fatigue.
This empirical approach improves on the identification strategy of Makofske (2019), which
uses routine health inspections from Los Angeles County, and finds that: compared to days
3Gray and Deily (1996), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Eckert (2004), and Telle (2009) use this approach
and find that higher predicted inspection probabilities suggest greater compliance with environmental regu-
lations among Canadian petroleum sites, pulp and paper plants in Quebec, the United States steel industry,
and Norwegian plants, respectively.
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when they receive the only inspection at their facility, food-service establishments are cited
for significantly fewer violations on days when they receive one of multiple inspections at
their facility. Yet, because the LA County data used in that study recorded only the dates
of inspections, on days when multiple inspections were conducted at a facility, the establish-
ment inspected first was unknown. As such, the Makofske (2019) estimates likely understate
the true sensitivity of compliance to inspection anticipation.
My results imply that sampled establishments exhibit significantly lower compliance lev-
els than are often detected due to their ability to anticipate some inspections. They also
suggest that average compliance among these establishments might improve if inspections
were deliberately scheduled so as to limit this ability, perhaps by making team visits to
multiple-establishment facilities.4
These findings also demonstrate a significant tradeoff that many public health agencies,
perhaps unknowingly, face. While it presumably reduces per-inspection costs, inspecting
multiple establishments during a single facility visit may also carry considerable consequences
relating to public health. In southern Nevada, it especially undermines the ability to detect
critical violations—described by the SNHD as “items directly related to the protection of the
public from foodborne illness or injury”. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) estimates that 48 million Americans contract a foodborne illness each year. Spe-
cific pathogens can be identified as the cause in about 9.4 million of the annual cases, and
Hoffmann et al. (2015) estimate that the economic burden of those cases alone exceeds 15.5
billion dollars.5 The potential drawbacks of these same-visit inspections merit serious consid-
eration wherever multiple-establishment facilities are common. Beyond estimating the effect
of inspection anticipation on detected compliance, this paper contributes a methodology for
doing so that public health departments may have sufficient data to employ themselves.
4There are rare occasions in the data where multiple inspectors were sent to larger facilities together.
Once arriving at a facility, inspectors then conducted separate inspections simultaneously. This practice
could potentially limit the frequency of anticipated inspections, while holding inspection resources fixed.
5See https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html for the CDC estimate. The Hoffmann
et al. (2015) estimate is measured in 2013 USD.
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My results are also relevant to recent work emphasizing the effectiveness of dynamic
enforcement in promoting compliance (Helland, 1998; Duflo et al., 2018; Blundell, 2020;
Blundell et al., 2020). Under dynamic enforcement regimes, firms are typically targeted
for more frequent inspections and/or subjected to harsher prospective punishments follow-
ing detected non-compliance. Just like their traditional counterparts, dynamic enforcement
regimes are underpinned by surprise (unanticipated) inspections. Moreover, because they
redirect enforcement resources over time based on observed compliance histories, inspection
anticipation could be especially problematic under dynamic enforcement regimes. For in-
stance, if inspections can be anticipated to some extent, dynamic enforcement measures may
unintentionally target firms that are least able to anticipate, rather than the worst offenders.
It is worth noting that SNHD policy includes some dynamic enforcement elements, which
are discussed in Section 2.
In the space remaining, I review the policies and process governing SNHD food inspec-
tions, the data and construction of my estimating sample. I then describe my empirical
strategy and present the main results. Finally, I subject these findings to a battery of
robustness tests that largely rule out alternative explanations, and then conclude.
2 Inspection Process and Regulatory Background
The Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) conducts routine health inspections of food-
service establishments in the Las Vegas, Nevada, metropolitan area. The SNHD was es-
tablished jointly by Clark County, and the cities of Boulder City, Henderson, Las Vegas,
Mesquite, and North Las Vegas, as the public health authority within those entities.
Annually, the SNHD conducts at least one routine unannounced inspection of all licensed
food establishments. Health code violations fall into four categories, and may carry demerits.
The most serious, imminent health hazards, result in immediate closure of the establishment
and fines. The SNHD defines the second most serious category, critical violations, as “items
4
directly related to the protection of the public from foodborne illness or injury”. Major
violations are items that “if left un-addressed may lead to a situation detrimental to public
health”. Violations of good food management practices—which I call good-practices viola-
tions for expositional ease—are considered least severe. Descriptions of all violations in each
category are provided in Tables A3, A4, and A5 of the Appendix.
Inspection performances are scored through the assessment of demerits on detected vi-
olations. Critical violations carry 5 demerits; major violations carry 3 demerits; and good-
practices violations carry 0 demerits. While imminent health hazards result in immediate
closure and the assessment of a fee, they do not actually carry demerits. Prior to 2014, good-
practices violations carried 1 demerit; and prior to March 25, 2010, the demerit schedule as
well as the violations and violation categories defined by the SNHD, were very different from
the current framework. Because of these changes, the sample is restricted to the current
regulatory regime, which began January 1, 2014.
The SNHD requires hygiene-quality disclosure through a grade-card policy. Section 8-
303.11 of revised Regulations Governing the Sanitation of Food Establishments, adopted
March 25, 2010, mandates that “every food establishment in the health authority’s juris-
diction shall post the health permit and grade card, stating the grade received at the time
of the most recent inspection, in an area that is clearly conspicuous to the consumer upon
entering the food establishment”.6
Letter grades are primarily based on total demerits from an establishment’s most recent
inspection. In general, 10 demerits or fewer result in an A grade, 11 to 20 demerits result
in a B grade, 21 to 40 demerits result in C grade, and more than 40 demerits force imme-
diate closure of the establishment and assessment of the closure fee. The basic letter-grade
schedule is then supplemented by dynamic-enforcement elements, whereby potential punish-
ments escalate based on an establishment’s past non-compliance. Any inspection involving a
consecutive identical critical or major violation—i.e., if the establishment commits the same
6The full regulations are available at https://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/permits-
and-regulations/food-establishment-regulations/.
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major or critical violation for a second straight inspection—will be downgraded one letter.7
Establishments must also be re-inspected within 15 business days of receiving a B or C
grade. Establishments assessed more than 10 demerits in re-inspections are: downgraded to
a C if the re-inspection follows a B grade, and closed with fines if the re-inspection follows a
C grade. Closed establishments require re-inspection and SNHD approval before re-opening.
3 Data and Estimation Sample
Data are from the Southern Nevada Health District (2020) website.8 Each observation corre-
sponds to an inspection and records (among other things) the establishment’s total demerits
from the inspection, the corresponding letter grade, the date and starting time of the inspec-
tion, and identifiers for the establishment inspected, the facility where the establishment is
located, and the inspector conducting the inspection.
The raw data span January 1, 2014 to March 9, 2020, and consist of 111,902 routine
inspections of 21,949 different licensed food establishments.9 The modal establishment in-
spected by the SNHD is classified as a restaurant. However, as seen in Table A1, the SNHD
conducts food inspections of various other establishment types. My primary estimating sam-
ple is restricted establishments categorized as restaurants by the SNHD, which account for
42,524 routine inspections in the raw data.10 Section A1.1 of the Appendix discusses the
process of cleaning the raw data, through which a relatively small number of observations
were corrected in some way, or dropped.
In estimation, the explanatory variable of interest is an indicator, Firsti,j,t, which equals
1 if establishment i receives the first inspection of a visit at facility j on date t, and equals
7Thus, when a consecutive identical major or critical violation is detected: 10 demerits or fewer result in
a B, 11 to 20 demerits result in a C, and 21 to 40 demerits force closure and assessment of the closure fee.
8See https://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/permits-and-regulations/restaurant-
inspections/developers/.
9I exclude re-inspections.
10The sign, significance, and relative magnitude of results are robust to broader samples, as shown in
Section 6.5.
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0 otherwise.11 To enable the inclusion of establishment fixed effects, the estimating sample
is restricted to establishments with: at least one routine inspection where Firsti,j,t = 1, and
at least one routine inspection where Firsti,j,t = 0.
A peculiar feature of SNHD regulations is that bars located within restaurants are as-
signed separate permits and receive their own inspections. Although the data do not directly
distinguish between stand-alone bars and those that are located within a restaurant, I am
able to identify the latter using names and permit numbers.12 In 4,019 visits where these
restaurants and the establishments they encompass were inspected, the apparent convention
is to inspect the restaurant first. However, there are 725 visits where the bar (or other es-
tablishment type) located within the restaurant is inspected first, and the restaurant second.
After the inspector’s arrival, these cases do allow the restaurants time to potentially remedy
violations before their inspections begin. But given that they break from the convention of
inspecting the restaurant first, they may be influenced by the inspectors’ initial impressions,
and thereby endogenous.13 For this reason, I exclude such observations from the estimating
sample as well as from the counts described in the previous paragraph.
These restrictions leave 8,411 routine inspections of 1,315 restaurants. To support the
inclusion of inspector fixed effects, the sample is further restricted to observations with in-
spectors who conducted: at least one routine inspection where Firsti,j,t = 1, and at least one
routine inspection where Firsti,j,t = 0. This yields the primary estimating sample of 8,375
routine inspections involving 1,312 restaurants, located within 704 different facilities. These
inspections are conducted by 129 different inspectors.
11Technically, t denotes the date that a visit to a facility began. Of 19,740 multiple-inspection visits, there
are 57 where, because the visit began very late, inspection starting times within the visit span two dates.
12When bars are located within restaurants, the permit numbers for the restaurant and bar are typically
different by one. See Table A2 of the Appendix for examples. While less common, there are also cases of
other establishment types (e.g., snack bars and prep kitchens) that appear to be located within restaurants,
but that are separately inspected and assigned unique license numbers.
13For instance, inspectors may have deviated from the conventional ordering if initial on-site observations
led them expect high compliance levels from the restaurant.
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4 Methodology
To estimate how inspection anticipation affects detected compliance, I compare individual
establishments’ performances across two inspection states: (1) inspector visits where the
establishment receives the first inspection at their facility (and has minimal ability to an-
ticipate the inspection), and (2) inspector visits where the establishment is inspected after
at least one other establishment in the facility (and has an elevated ability to anticipate the
inspection). An underlying assumption is that when Firsti,j,t = 0, in the time between the
inspector’s arrival at the facility and the start of the inspection, establishments are capable
of complying with health codes that they were violating at the time of arrival.14
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the estimating sample, and makes comparisons
across these two inspections states. Following a routine inspection, establishments are closed
if they receive more than 40 demerits, or if an imminent health hazard is found. There are
38 inspections in the estimating sample where establishments were closed due to an immi-
nent health hazard, but assessed fewer than 41 demerits. The variable, adjusted demerits,
assesses 41 demerits in these inspections in an attempt to better reflect the severity of the
non-compliance. Relative to inspections where Firsti,j,t = 0, establishments are assessed
46.41 percent more demerits, and are cited for 41.98 percent more violations when they re-
ceive the first inspection of a visit at their facility. However, if propensity to be inspected
first correlates with establishment-specific characteristics that influence hygiene quality, these
simple comparisons may mislead. As such, establishment fixed effects are included in esti-
mation to overcome this issue.
Estimating equations take the form,
yi,j,t = α1Firsti,j,t +X
′
i,j,tα+ ai + ǫi,j,t, (1)
14Support for this assumption is provided in Section 6.
8
where yi,j,t is an inspection outcome (e.g., total demerits) for establishment i, located in
facility j, during a routine inspection on date t. Recall, Firsti,j,t equals 1 if establishment i
receives the first inspection at facility j on date t, and equals 0 otherwise.
Establishment fixed effects are included to account for time-invariant and restaurant-
specific characteristics which might otherwise correlate with hygiene quality and propensity
to be inspected first. Under the full specification for equation (1), the vector Xi,j,t contains
fixed effects for the inspector conducting an inspection, the starting hour of the inspection,15
and: the day of the week, month of the year, and year when the inspection occurred.
5 Results
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) with demerits as the
dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered two-way on facility and inspector allowing
for error-term correlation (of arbitrary form) within facilities, as well as inspector-specific
correlation that may arise across facilities. Column (1) reports a simple specification in
which establishment fixed effects are the only included controls. In column (2), fixed effects
for the starting hour of the inspection, as well as the day of the week, month of the year, and
year in which the inspection occurred, are added. The full specification, reported in column
(3), includes inspector fixed effects as well. Column (4) reports full-specification estimates
but using adjusted demerits as the dependent variable.16
These estimates show a significant and substantial increase in detected non-compliance
when restaurants lack the ability to anticipate their inspection. Recall that on average,
5.7325 demerits are detected when the ability to anticipate inspections is elevated. Relative
to that value, the full-specification coefficient on First of 1.1934, represents a 20.82 percent
15A small number of inspections begin in the early hours of days, prior to 7 A.M. There are insufficient
observations to include separate indicators for each of these hours. Thus, among the starting-hour fixed
effects is an indicator equal to 1 if the inspection began prior to 7 A.M.
16The demerits and adjusted demerits variables are identical with the exception of 38 observations where
imminent health hazards were detected and demerits were less than 41. In these observations adjusted
demerits equals 41.
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increase in demerits.
To evaluate the effect of anticipation in different terms, Table 3 reports full-specification
estimates with counts of detected violations in each of the SNHD categories as dependent
variables. Relative to means when First = 0, these estimates demonstrate that establish-
ments are cited for 30.96 percent more critical violations, and 14.51 percent more major
violations when the inspections are unanticipated. Imminent health hazards are relatively
rare, and the estimated difference in their detection conditional on Firsti,j,t is statistically
insignificant at conventional levels. Descriptions in Table A3 suggest that many imminent
health hazards are violations that can’t be quickly remedied, even with several hour’s notice
of an inspector’s presence (e.g., interruption of electrical service, lack of potable water, or
lack of hot water). As such, this estimate seems consistent with the modest differences in
anticipation ability reflected by variation in Firsti,j,t.
In contextualizing these results, the substantial effect of inspection anticipation on critical-
violation detection seems especially meaningful. Per the SNHD’s description, this finding
suggests that actions which are “directly related to the protection of the public from food-
borne illness” go significantly under-detected due to anticipation of inspections. Paired with
that description, this result suggests that the practice of inspecting multiple establishments
during a single facility visit may carry very significant public health costs.
6 Robustness Analysis
6.1 Testing an Underlying Assumption
An assumption underlying my empirical strategy is that, just prior to inspections where
Firsti,j,t = 0, establishments are able to remedy some violations that would otherwise be
detected. In the estimating sample’s 3,361 inspections where Firsti,j,t = 0, establishments
are inspected about 84 minutes after the inspector’s arrival on average; and roughly 81 per-
cent of these inspections begin within two hours of arrival (the distribution of starting times,
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measured in minutes since the inspector’s arrival at a facility, is shown in Figure 1).17 Thus,
αˆ1 should reflect the detection of violations that can be fixed rather quickly.
To test the validity of this underlying assumption, I endeavor to distinguish violations that
can likely be remedied on short notice (flexible violations), and violations that clearly can’t
be remedied the same day as an inspector visit (rigid violations). If Firsti,j,t is capturing—as
intended—sharp variation in anticipation ability, it should have a significant effect on the
detection of flexible violations, but little effect on the detection of rigid violations.
I construct both a narrow and broad classification for flexible violations. An establish-
ment’s staff may commit some violations by not following certain procedures or by doing
things that are prohibited (e.g., by not washing hands as and when required, or by reusing
single-use items). Because anticipation of an upcoming inspection gives an establishment’s
person-in-charge a chance to quickly remind staff about such practices, the narrow classifi-
cation consists of these sorts of procedural violations. The broader grouping also includes
violations that can be quickly fixed but require actions that go beyond simply issuing re-
minders (e.g., cleaning food contact surfaces, or ensuring that food has been properly stored
to prevent contamination).
By contrast, rigid violations involve requirements such as the installation and mainte-
nance of warewashing and refrigeration equipment, having adequate and functional plumb-
ing, and preventing pest infestation. Because establishments can’t suddenly fix these sorts
of violations given a few hours’ notice, we wouldn’t expect First to affect their detection.
Table 4 lists and describes the violations categorized into each group.18
Table 5 reports full-specification estimates of equation (1) with narrowly-defined flexible
violations, broadly-defined flexible violations, and rigid violations, as dependent variables.
Consistent with the underlying assumption, significantly and substantially more flexible vi-
olations are detected when establishments receive the first inspection of a visit at their facil-
17The recorded starting time of the first inspection is treated as the arrival time.
18Attention was restricted to penalized violations only (i.e., imminent health hazard, critical, and major
violations).
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ities. Relative to means when Firsti,j,t = 0, unanticipated inspections detect 25.56 percent
more of the narrowly-defined flexible violations, and 18.10 percent more of the broadly-
defined flexible violations. Also consistent with the underlying assumption, the effect of
First on the detection of rigid violations, while positive, is relatively small (a 4.91 percent
increase) and very close to zero.
6.2 Testing Exogeneity of Inspection Ordering
The evidence presented thus far demonstrates that, relative to their own performances when
inspected after others in their facility, establishments perform significantly worse when they
receive the first inspection of a visit. The effect is robust to a variety of additional controls
and, consistent with underlying assumptions, concentrated among violations that can be
quickly remedied. In this section, I consider whether endogenous inspection ordering could
alternatively explain these results.
The methodology employed consistently estimates the effect of inspection anticipation,
so long as First is uncorrelated with any omitted or unobservable factors that also affect
the inspection outcome. Establishment fixed effects control for any time-invariant and
establishment-specific traits explaining cross-sectional variation in compliance. Thus, omit-
ted variables are only problematic if, conditional on included controls, propensity to be
inspected first and within-establishment variation in compliance correlate over time.
To address this potential issue, I entertain the possibility that inspectors’ compliance
expectations may influence the order in which they inspect the establishments at a facility.
For instance, if propensity to be inspected first is higher for establishments that performed
worse than usual in their prior inspection, and if worse-than-usual performances tend to in-
dicate persistent declines in hygiene quality; then αˆ1 might partially capture these persistent
declines, rather than the effect of inspection anticipation. To the extent that inspectors’
current compliance expectations are influenced by establishments’ inspection histories, this
potential issue can be resolved by controlling for past inspection performances.
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Table 6 reports full-specification estimates of equation (1), with lagged demerits—an es-
tablishment’s total demerits from their most recent prior routine inspection—included as a
control. Dependent variables in Table 6 are: demerits, adjusted demerits, critical violations,
and major violations. In all four columns, coefficients on Firsti,j,t are very similar in sign,
significance, and magnitude, to corresponding estimates in Tables 2 and 3. Table A6 of the
Appendix reports this same analysis, but with narrowly-defined flexible violations, broadly-
defined flexible violations, and rigid violations, as dependent variables. Those coefficients
on First are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude, albeit slightly smaller for broadly-
defined flexible violations, and slightly larger on rigid violations.
At some of the sampled facilities, there are visits where multiple establishments are in-
spected, as well as visits where only one establishment is inspected. As an additional test, I
restrict the estimating sample to exclude observations from single-inspection visits, in case
such visits were targeted to establishments where hygiene quality declines were suspected.
Table 7 reports full-specification estimates from this restricted sample with demerits, ad-
justed demerits, critical violations, and major violations as dependent variables. Across all
four outcomes, coefficients on First remain very similar in sign, significance, and magnitude,
to corresponding estimates in Tables 2 and 3.19
The estimates in Table 6 reveal that establishments perform significantly worse when
inspected first, even after conditioning on their previous inspection performance (in case
persistent hygiene quality declines increase propensity to be inspected first). However, per-
haps inspection ordering is influenced by information that is observable to inspectors, but
not reflected in establishments’ inspection-performance metrics? To address this possibility,
I restrict the estimating sample to observations where establishments faced a different in-
spector than in their previous routine inspection. Because these inspectors weren’t present
for the restaurant’s prior inspection, it is doubtful that their expectations are informed by
19Estimates from this restricted sample using flexible and rigid violations as the dependent variable are
reported in Table A7 of the Appendix. These estimates are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude to
results from Table 5.
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much—if anything—more than reported inspection-performance metrics. Using this subsam-
ple, Table 8 reports estimates of the same specifications used in Table 6. These estimates,
though slightly smaller and with slightly larger standard errors, are still qualitatively similar
to those in Table 6, as well as those in Tables 2 and 3.
Finally, recall from Table 5 shows that the effect of First—conditional on controls—is
largely concentrated among violations capable of quick remedy. While this is consistent with
First capturing differences in anticipation ability, we wouldn’t necessarily expect endogenous
inspection ordering to produce such a pattern. This same point applies to repeat inspector
visits and inspector fatigue, which are addressed below.
6.3 Accounting For Repeat Inspector Visits
Jin and Lee (2018) find that a combination of heterogeneous inspector criteria and diminish-
ing attention explain a significant gap in cited violations between new and repeat inspectors
in Florida restaurant inspections. To test whether repeat visits correlate with inspection
ordering in a problematic way, I estimate
yi,j,t = β1
(
Firsti,j,t × Diffi,t
)
+ β2Firsti,j,t + β3Diffi,t +X
′
i,j,tβ + bi + ui,j,t; (2)
where Diffi,t equals 1 if, on date t, establishment i is inspected by a different inspector than
in their previous inspection, and equals 0 otherwise. βˆ2 estimates a similar parameter to
the estimates from Table 8, but with a larger sample and without controlling for lagged
inspection performance.
Estimates of equation (2) are reported in Table 9. While additional violations and de-
merits are associated with non-repeat inspector visits, the differences when First = 0, and
when First = 1, are both statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Moreover, in
non-repeat-inspector visits, the effects of First on demerits, adjusted demerits, and critical
violations are still quite large. Overall, the main results are largely robust to the effect of
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repeat inspector visits.
6.4 Allowing for Inspector Fatigue
Ibanez and Toffel (2019) find evidence suggesting inspector fatigue may affect the detection
and citation of violations in food-safety inspections. Using data from Lake County, Illinois,
Camden County, New Jersey, and the state of Alaska, they find that inspectors cite fewer
violations later in their shifts. Such an effect might confound my estimates as inspections
where Firsti,j,t = 0 are, by nature, more likely to occur later in inspector shifts. To address
this potential issue, I estimate equation (1) under several subsamples in which inspector
fatigue is unlikely to explain differences in detected compliance.
Although inspector shifts are not formally recorded in the data, I use inspector identifiers
and inspection starting times to determine when the first and last inspections of shifts likely
began. Table 10 reports estimates of equation (1) with the sample restricted to restaurant
inspections where Firsti,j,t = 1, or Firsti,j,t = 0 where the inspection begins within 4 hours
of the first inspection of an inspector’s shift. Coefficients on First are very similar in sign,
significance, and magnitude, to corresponding estimates under the primary estimating sam-
ple.
Additionally, I repeat this estimation with demerits as the dependent variable, and the
sample restricted to restaurant inspections where: Firsti,j,t = 1, or Firsti,j,t = 0 that began
within x hours of the first inspection of the inspector’s shift, for all x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}. Figure
2 displays coefficients from these regressions along with 99-percent confidence intervals. No-
tice that the effect of Firsti,j,t on detected demerits is very stable across all of these samples,
and even after excluding any inspections where Firsti,j,t = 0 that began more than one hour
after the first inspection of a shift. These estimates give no indication that inspector fatigue
is driving any of the estimated effect of First.
Finally, I also exclude inspections where Firsti,j,t = 0 that begin 90 minutes or less before
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the last inspection of an inspector’s shift.20 Estimates from this restricted sample—reported
in Table A8 of the Appendix—are very similar to those from Section 5 in sign, significance,
and magnitude. The estimates reported in this subsection strongly suggest that the esti-
mated effects of First are not an artifact of inspector fatigue.
6.5 Robustness to Broader Estimating Samples
The primary estimating sample was limited to establishments coded by the SNHD as restau-
rants. Nonetheless, my main results are robust to broader estimating samples. Table A9 of
the Appendix reports full-specification estimates of equation (1) with the sample expanded
to include establishments coded by the SNHD as a: restaurant, bar/tavern, buffet, or snack
bar. Coefficients on First are similar to those from the primary sample in sign and signifi-
cance, and—with the exception of the effect of major violations—slightly smaller in absolute
magnitude. In relative magnitude however, the effects are slightly larger. Relative to this
sample’s means when Firsti,j,t = 0, these estimates suggest that establishments are assessed
26.97 percent more demerits, and are cited for 35.08 percent more critical violations, and
23.17 percent more major violations when inspected first.21
Table A10 of the Appendix reports similar estimates with the estimating sample ex-
panded to include all establishment types. Coefficients on First from this broadest possible
estimating sample are quite similar to the primary results in sign and significance, and
slightly smaller absolute and relative magnitude.
7 Concluding Remarks
Inspection programs are central to enforcing a wide range of environmental, health, and
safety regulations. However, an ability among regulated firms to anticipate inspection tim-
20Ibanez and Toffel (2019) hypothesize that inspectors may cite fewer violations in inspections that risk
extending their shifts past normal durations.
21By comparison, full-specification estimates with the primary estimating sample yielded relative effects of
20.82 percent more demerits, 30.96 percent more critical violations, and 14.51 percent more major violations.
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ing could render these programs—which are central to ensuring environmental quality as
well as consumer and worker safety—less effective.
Using Southern Nevada Health District food inspections spanning 2014 to early 2020,
I find that detected compliance is quite sensitive to the ability to anticipate inspections.
Compared to visits when they are inspected after another establishment in their facility,
restaurants are assessed 20.65 percent more demerits, and are cited for 28.86 percent more
critical violations when they receive the first inspection of a visit to their facility. These find-
ings suggest that within multiple-establishment facilities, even on days of inspection visits,
a substantial number of critical violations go undetected because establishments anticipate
their coming inspection in advance. A battery of tests rule out endogenous inspection or-
dering and inspector fatigue as possible alternative explanations of these results.
Given the relative ubiquity of multiple-establishment facilities, and the apparent cost-
effectiveness of conducting multiple inspections during a single visit, these results are may
be widely relevant. Following the methodology employed here, public health authorities
with sufficient data can estimate the sensitivity of compliance to the practice of conducting
multiple same-visit inspections within their own jurisdictions; and potentially, use that in-
formation to improve the effectiveness of their inspection programs.
More generally, the incorporation of dynamic enforcement elements into inspection pro-
grams is very promising (Helland, 1998; Duflo et al., 2018; Blundell, 2020; Blundell et al.,
2020). To be effective however, dynamic enforcement requires that inspections reliably detect
which firms are truly least compliant, and thus, the correct targets of elevated scrutiny. This
underscores the importance of appropriately limiting the ability to anticipate the timing of
visits in inspection programs.
Finally, an interesting feature of SNHD food inspections over this period are occasions
when multiple inspectors were sent to larger facilities together. Once arriving at the facility,
17
inspectors then conducted separate inspections simultaneously.22 This practice, though rel-
atively rare, is promising because it limits inspection anticipation in a cost-effective manner.
Each additional inspector sent provides an additional surprise inspection without incurring
the cost of a separate visit to the facility. Moreover, if inspectors carpool on these occa-
sions, team visits presumably reduce the explicit per-inspection costs of inspecting multiple-
establishment facilities. The practice of teams visits has potential to mitigate some of the
inherent tradeoff between the surprise nature of inspections and the costs associated with
inspecting multiple-establishment facilities.
22Muehlenbachs et al. (2016) find that sending additional inspectors to offshore oil and gas platforms
increases both the number and severity of sanctions issued, suggesting that team inspections of a single
entity are more intense. Here, teams being sent to a single facility, but then inspecting separate entities
independently.
18
References
Blundell, W. (2020). When threats become credible: A natural experiment of environmental
enforcement from Florida. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 101,
102288.
Blundell, W., G. Gowrisankaran, and A. Langer (2020). Escalation of scrutiny: The gains
from dynamic enforcement of environmental regulations. American Economic Review .
Forthcoming.
Duflo, E., M. Greenstone, R. Pande, and N. Ryan (2018). The value of regulatory discretion:
Estimates from environmental inspections in India. Econometrica 86 (6), 2123–2160.
Eckert, H. (2004). Inspections, warnings, and compliance: The case of petroleum storage
regulation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47 (2), 232–259.
Gray, W. and M. E. Deily (1996). Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation
in the U.S. steel industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31 (1),
96–111.
Gray, W. B. and J. P. Shimshack (2011). The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and
Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence. Review of Environmental Economics
and Policy 5 (1), 3–24.
Helland, E. (1998). The enforcement of pollution control laws: Inspections, violations, and
self-reporting. Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (1), 141–153.
Hoffmann, S., B. Maculloch, and M. Batz (2015). Economic burden of major foodborne
illnesses acquired in the United States. Economic information bulletin number 140, United
States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service.
Ibanez, M. and M. W. Toffel (2019). How scheduling can bias quality assessment: Evidence
from food safety inspections. Management Science. Forthcoming.
19
Jin, G. Z. and J. Lee (2018). A tale of repetition: Lessons from Florida restaurant inspections.
Journal of Law and Economics 61 (1), 159–188.
Laplante, B. and P. Rilstone (1996). Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and
paper industry in Quebec. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31 (1),
19–36.
Makofske, M. P. (2019). Inspection regimes and regulatory compliance: How important is
the element of surprise? Economics Letters 177 (C), 30–34.
Muehlenbachs, L., S. Staubli, and M. Cohen (2016). The impact of team inspections on
enforcement and deterrence. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists 3 (1), 159 – 204.
Southern Nevada Health District (2020). Entire restaurant/food establishment
database. Retrieved from https://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/permits-
and-regulations/restaurant-inspections/developers/.
Telle, K. (2009). The threat of regulatory environmental inspection: Impact on plant per-
formance. Journal of Regulatory Economics 35 (2), 154–178.
20
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
R
el
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600
Minutes Since Inspector's Arrival
Figure 1: Start of Inspection After Inspector’s Arrival
For inspections in the estimating sample where Firsti,j,t = 0, the distribution of minutes elapsed
between an inspector’s arrival at a facility and the start of an inspection. Starting time of a visit’s
first inspection is treated as the inspector’s arrival time at the facility. Bins are 10 minutes wide.
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Figure 2: Allowing for Possible Inspector Fatigue
Restricted-sample estimates of the effect of First on detected demerits, from the specification given
in column (1) of Table 10. The horizontal axis measures x, where samples are restricted to in-
spections where Firsti,j,t = 1, or Firsti,j,t = 0 and the inspection began within x hours of the first
inspection of an inspector’s shift. Red dots mark coefficients on First, and navy bars mark 99%
confidence intervals from standard errors clustered two-way on inspector and facility.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Establishment Level
Inspections 1,312 6.3834 (2.0958) 2 17
Inspections | Firsti,j,t = 1 1,312 3.8216 (2.2570) 1 13
Inspections | Firsti,j,t = 0 1,312 2.5617 (1.6135) 1 10
Inspection Level
Demerits 8,375 7.3251 (7.1185) 0 61
Demerits | Firsti,j,t = 1 5,014 8.3927 (7.5673) 0 61
Demerits | Firsti,j,t = 0 3,361 5.7325 (6.0512) 0 50
Adjusted Demerits 8,375 7.4220 (7.3899) 0 61
Adjusted Demerits | Firsti,j,t = 1 5,014 8.5112 (7.8542) 0 61
Adjusted Demerits | Firsti,j,t = 0 3,361 5.7971 (6.2974) 0 50
All Violations 8,375 3.2004 (2.6981) 0 26
All Violations | Firsti,j,t = 1 5,014 3.6312 (2.8362) 0 26
All Violations | Firsti,j,t = 0 3,361 2.5576 (2.3347) 0 18
Summary statistics from the primary estimation sample of restaurants from January 1, 2014 to
March 9, 2020, with at least: one inspection where Firsti,j,t = 1, and one inspection where
Firsti,j,t = 0.
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Table 2: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Demerits Demerits Adj. Demerits
First 1.1930*** 1.2576*** 1.1934*** 1.2386***
(0.3394) (0.3118) (0.3784) (0.3833)
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE N Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
Inspector FE N N Y Y
R-squared 0.3727 0.3874 0.4559 0.4398
N 8,375 8,375 8,375 8,375
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants. Standard errors, clustered two-way on in-
spector and facility, are reported in parentheses. In 38 inspections, establishments were closed due
to imminent health hazards, but were assessed fewer than 41 demerits (the threshold at which
establishments are forced to close absent imminent health hazards). Adjusted demerits, the de-
pendent variable in column (4), equals 41 in these 38 observations, and is identical to the assessed
demerits otherwise.
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Table 3: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance: Violations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable IHH Critical Major Good-practices
Violations Violations Violations Violations
First 0.0008 0.1414*** 0.1667** 0.1180*
(0.0027) (0.0409) (0.0782) (0.0624)
Mean | Firsti,j,t = 0 0.0036 0.4567 1.1488 0.9485
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.1468 0.3470 0.4405 0.4824
N 8,375 8,375 8,375 8,375
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants. Standard errors, clustered two-way on
inspector and facility, are reported in parentheses. The third row of results reports simple averages
from the estimating sample when First = 0.
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Table 4: Rigid and Flexible Violations
Code Description
RIGID VIOLATIONS
Imminent Health Hazards
IHH-1 Interruption of electrical service
IHH-2 No potable water or hot water
IHH-3 Gross unsanitary occurrences or conditions including pest infestation
IHH-4 Sewage or liquid waste not disposed of in an approved manner
IHH-5 Lack of adequate refrigeration
IHH-6 Lack of adequate employee toilets and handwashing facilities
Critical Violations
3 Commercially manufactured food from approved source with required
labels. Parasite destruction as required. Potentially hazardous foods/time
temperature control for safety (PHF/TCS) received at proper temperature.
4 Hot and cold running water from approved source as required.
Major Violations
10 Food and warewashing equipment approved, properly designed, constructed,
and installed.
16 Effective pest control measures. Animals restricted as required.
17 Hot and cold holding equipment present. Properly designed, maintained, and
operated.
22 Backflow prevention devices and methods in place and maintained.
FLEXIBLE VIOLATIONS
Critical Violations
* 2 Handwashing (as required, when required, proper glove use, no bare hand
contact of ready to eat foods). Foodhandler health restrictions as required.
* 7 PHF/TCSs cooked and reheated to proper temperatures.
* 8 PHF/TCSs properly cooled.
* 9 PHF/TCSs at proper temperatures during storage, display, service,
transport, and holding.
Major Violations
** 11 Food protected from potential contamination during storage and preparation.
** 12 Food protected from potential contamination by chemicals. Toxic items properly
labeled, stored and used.
** 14 Kitchenware and food contact surfaces of equipment properly washed, rinsed,
sanitized, and air dried. Equipment for warewashing operated and maintained.
Sanitizer solution provided and maintained as required.
* 20 Single use items not reused or misused.
* Included in narrow and broad flexible violation categories.
** Included only in broad flexible violation category.
PHF stands for potentially hazardous food. TCS stands for temperature control for safety. Common
TCS foods include dairy products (which must be stored below certain temperatures to prevent
spoilage) and meats (which must reach a certain temperatures when cooked in to kill possible
pathogens).
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Table 5: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance by Nature of Vi-
olation
(1) (2) (3)
Narrowly-defined Broadly-defined
Variable Flexible Violations Flexible Violations Rigid Violations
First 0.0823** 0.1515** 0.0102
(0.0341) (0.0607) (0.0223)
Mean | Firsti,j,t = 0 0.3219 0.8367 0.2083
Establishment FE Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
R-squared 0.3333 0.4248 0.2506
N 8,375 8,375 8,375
**p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants. Standard errors, clustered two-way on
inspector and facility, are reported in parentheses. The third row of results reports simple averages
from the estimating sample when First = 0.
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Table 6: Controlling for Most Recent Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.2100*** 1.2248*** 0.1454*** 0.1616**
(0.4075) (0.4064) (0.0418) (0.0802)
Lagged Demerits -0.0955 -0.0990 -0.0106 -0.0142
(0.0967) (0.0966) (0.0086) (0.0187)
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4778 0.4605 0.3712 0.4603
N 6,451 6,451 6,451 6,451
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants. Lagged demerits is the establishment’s total
demerits from their most recent prior routine inspection. Standard errors, clustered two-way on
inspector and facility, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance: Multiple-
Inspection Visits Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.2360*** 1.2673*** 0.1434*** 0.1723**
(0.3676) (0.3739) (0.0402) (0.0764)
Mean | Firsti,j,t = 0 5.8417 5.9034 0.4685 1.1655
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4509 0.4347 0.3406 0.4387
N 7,807 7,807 7,807 7,807
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants, during visits where multiple inspections
were conducted at the facility. Standard errors, clustered two-way on inspector and facility, are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 8: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance: Visits from New
Inspector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.1115** 1.0423** 0.1297*** 0.1543*
(0.4576) (0.4714) (0.0494) (0.0916)
Lagged Demerits -0.1473 -0.1545 -0.0177 -0.0196
(0.1147) (0.1183) (0.0119) (0.0213)
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.5581 0.5518 0.4706 0.5230
N 3,307 3,307 3,307 3,307
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
OLS estimates from routine inspections where restaurants faced an inspector other than the one who
had conducted their most recent prior routine inspection. Lagged demerits is the establishment’s
total demerits from their most recent prior routine inspection. Standard errors are clustered two-
way on the inspector and facility, and reported in parentheses.
Table 9: Accounting for Repeat Inspector Visits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First×Diff 0.2526 0.1494 0.0084 0.0674
(0.5016) (0.5228) (0.0563) (0.1043)
First 1.0682** 1.1589** 0.1374** 0.1280
(0.4766) (0.4832) (0.0554) (0.0908)
New 0.5444 0.5018 0.0536 0.0943
(0.4529) (0.4773) (0.0476) (0.0966)
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4577 0.4409 0.3479 0.4420
N 8,375 8,375 8,375 8,375
**p < 0.05
OLS estimates. Diffi,t = 1 if establishment i is isnpected by a different inspector than in their
most recent inspection. Standard errors are clustered two-way on the inspector and facility, and
reported in parentheses.
Table 10: Addressing Potential Inspector Fatigue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.2335*** 1.2445*** 0.1431*** 0.1719**
(0.3929) (0.3889) (0.0427) (0.0822)
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4595 0.4432 0.3532 0.4455
N 7,350 7,350 7,350 7,350
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restuarants where Firsti,j,t = 1, or Firsti,j,t = 0 and the
inspection began at within 4 hours of the first inspection in an inspector’s shift.
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A1 Appendix
A1.1 Data Cleaning
In cleaning the raw data, corrections were made for 35 inspection starting times where the
entry of AM or PM appeared mistaken. These were found by grouping the inspections
conducted by inspectors on each date, and noticing unusually large gaps between starting
times in those groupings. Upon closer examination the gaps could be explained by a single
entry of AM or PM that was inconsistent with the others from that inspector-date.
In 36 inspections, the date is reported without a starting time. These observations,
and all inspections conducted at the same facility that date (48 additional observations)
are dropped, because the first establishment inspected for these visits can’t be known with
certainty.
In 153 inspector-visits, the two earliest reported inspection starting times are the same;
and in 6 inspector-visits, the three earliest reported inspection starting times are the same.
The 324 observations with identical starting times in these visits are excluded in estimation;
because it is unknown which of the establishments were inspected first, and which were not.
Finally, there are 44 routine restaurant inspections where an A grade is reported for
establishments with more than 10 demerits, which contradicts SNHD grading policy. Because
it is unclear which entry (demerits or grade) is incorrect, these observations are also excluded
in estimation. Excluding versus including these observations ultimately has a negligible effect
on results.
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Table A1: Establishment Types in Raw Data
Establishment Type Number of Establishments
Bakery Sales 81
Banquet Kitchen 89
Banquet Support 38
Bar/Tavern 4,151
Barbeque 127
Beer Bar 14
Buffet 437
Caterer 332
Childcare Kitchens 50
Concessions 69
Confection 38
Elementary School Kitchen 263
Farmer’s Market 32
Food Trucks / Mobile Vendor 755
Frozen Meat Sales 23
Garde Manger 84
Grocery Store Sampling 82
Institutional Food Service 140
Kitchen Bakery 100
Main Kitchen 4
Meat/Poultry/Seafood 198
Pantry 446
Portable Bar 74
Portable Unit 918
Produce Market 102
Restaurant 7,646
Self-Service Food Truck 63
Snack Bar 2,287
Special Kitchen 2,115
Vegetable Prep 47
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Table A2: Bars Located Within Restaurants
Establishment
Inspection Time Permit # Name Type
2019-06-28 16:40:30 0132075 LA CATRINA BAR & GRILL Restaurant
2019-06-28 17:30:00 0132074 LA CATRINA BAR & GRILL BAR Bar/Tavern
2014-04-02 12:10:00 0018364 Buffalo Wild Wings - Grill #179 Restaurant
2014-04-02 12:55:00 0018365 Buffalo Wild Wings - Bar #179 Bar/Tavern
2015-09-17 12:40:00 0009001 Steiner’s Pub Restaurant Restaurant
2015-09-17 14:00:00 0009002 Steiner’s Pub Bar/Tavern
2016-07-07 14:35:00 0017430 On The Border - Restaurant Restaurant
2016-07-07 15:30:00 0017431 On The Border - Bar Bar/Tavern
2018-01-11 15:45:00 0004084 Chili’s Grill #1264 Restaurant Restaurant
2018-01-11 17:00:00 0004085 Chili’s Grill #1264 - Bar Bar/Tavern
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Table A3: SNHD Food Establishment Violations: Imminent Health Hazards
and Critical Violations
Code Description
Imminent Health Hazards
IHH-1 Interruption of electrical service
IHH-2 No potable water or hot water
IHH-3 Gross unsanitary occurrences or conditions including pest infestation
IHH-4 Sewage or liquid waste not disposed of in an approved manner
IHH-5 Lack of adequate refrigeration
IHH-6 Lack of adequate employee toilets and handwashing facilities
IHH-7 Misuse of poisonous or toxic materials
IHH-8 Suspected foodborne illness outbreak
IHH-9 Emergency such as fire and/or flood
IHH-10 Other condition or circumstance that may endanger public health
Critical Violations
1 Verifiable time as a control with approved procedure
when in use. Operational plan, waiver or variance approved and followed
when required. Operating within the parameters of the health permit.
2 Handwashing (as required, when required, proper glove use, no bare hand
contact of ready to eat foods). Foodhandler health restrictions as required.
3 Commercially manufactured food from approved source with required
labels. Parasite destruction as required. Potentially hazardous foods/time
temperature control for safety (PHF/TCS) received at proper temperature.
4 Hot and cold running water from approved source as required.
5 Imminently dangerous cross connection or backflow. Waste water and sewage
disposed into public sewer or approved facility.
6 Food wholesome; not spoiled, contaminated, or adulterated.
7 PHF/TCSs cooked and reheated to proper temperatures.
8 PHF/TCSs properly cooled.
9 PHF/TCSs at proper temperatures during storage, display, service,
transport, and holding.
PHF stands for potentially hazardous food. TCS stands for temperature control for safety. Common
TCS foods include dairy products (which must be stored below certain temperatures to prevent
spoilage) and meats (which must reach a certain temperatures when cooked in to kill possible
pathogens).
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Table A4: SNHD Food Establishment Violations: Major Violations
Code Description
Major Violations
10 Food and warewashing equipment approved, properly designed, constructed,
and installed.
11 Food protected from potential contamination during storage and preparation.
12 Food protected from potential contamination by chemicals. Toxic items properly
labeled, stored and used.
13 Food protected from potential contamination by employees and consumers.
14 Kitchenware and food contact surfaces of equipment properly washed, rinsed,
sanitized, and air dried. Equipment for warewashing operated and maintained.
Sanitizer solution provided and maintained as required.
15 Handwashing facilities adequate in number, stocked, accessible, and limited to
handwashing only.
16 Effective pest control measures. Animals restricted as required.
17 Hot and cold holding equipment present. Properly designed, maintained, and
operated.
18 Accurate thermometers (stem & hot/cold holding) provided and used.
19 PHF/TCSs properly thawed. Fruits and vegetables washed prior to preparation
or service.
20 Single use items not reused or misused.
21 Person in charge available and knowledgeable/management certification.
Foodhandler card as required. Facility has an effective employee health policy.
22 Backflow prevention devices and methods in place and maintained.
23 Grade card and required signs posted conspicuously. Consumer advisory as
required. Records/logs maintained and available when required. NCIAA
compliant. PHFs labeled and dated as required. Food sold for offsite consumption
labeled properly.
PHF stands for potentially hazardous food. TCS stands for temperature control for safety. Common
TCS foods include dairy products (which must be stored below certain temperatures to prevent
spoilage) and meats (which must reach a certain temperatures when cooked in to kill possible
pathogens).
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Table A5: SNHD Food Establishment Violations: Good Food Management
Practices
Code Description
Good Food Management Practices
24 Acceptable personal hygiene practices, clean outer garments, proper hair restraints
used. Living quarters and child care completely separated from food service.
25 Non-PHF and food storage containers properly labeled and dated as required.
Non-PHF/TCS not spoiled and within shelf-life. Proper retail storage of chemicals.
26 Facilities for washing and sanitizing kitchenware approved, adequate, properly
constructed, maintained, and operated.
27 Appropriate sanitizer test kits provided and used. Ware washing thermometer(s)
as required. Wiping cloths and linens stored and used properly.
28 Small wares and portable appliances approved, properly designed, in good repair.
29 Utensils, equipment, and single serve items properly handled, stored, and dispensed.
30 Nonfood contact surfaces and equipment properly constructed, installed, maintained,
and clean.
31 Restrooms, mop sink, and custodial areas maintained and clean. Premises maintained
free of litter, unnecessary equipment, or personal effects. Trash areas adequate,
pest proof, and clean.
32 Facility in sound condition and maintained (floors, walls, ceilings, plumbing, lighting,
ventilation, etc.).
PHF stands for potentially hazardous food. TCS stands for temperature control for safety. Common
TCS foods include dairy products (which must be stored below certain temperatures to prevent
spoilage) and meats (which must reach a certain temperatures when cooked in to kill possible
pathogens).
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Table A6: Detected Compliance by Nature of Violation: Controlling for
Most Recent Performance
(1) (2) (3)
Narrowly-defined Broadly-defined
Variable Flexible Violations Flexible Violations Rigid Violations
First 0.0836** 0.1352** 0.0152
(0.0372) (0.0668) (0.0228)
Lagged Demerits -0.0090 -0.0123 -0.0035
(0.0062) (0.0133) (0.0043)
Establishment FE Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
R-squared 0.3505 0.4435 0.2647
N 6,451 6,451 6,451
**p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants. Lagged demerits is the establishment’s total
demerits from their most recent prior routine inspection. Standard errors, clustered two-way at the
inspector and facility levels, are reported in parentheses.
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Table A7: Detected Compliance by Nature of Violation: Multiple-Inspection
Visits Only
(1) (2) (3)
Narrowly-defined Broadly-defined
Variable Flexible Violations Flexible Violations Rigid Violations
First 0.0802** 0.1557*** 0.0120
(0.0343) (0.0604) (0.0228)
Establishment FE Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y
R-squared 0.3268 0.4208 0.2473
N 5,692 5,692 5,692
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restaurants during visits where multiple inspections were
conducted at the facility. Standard errors are clustered two-way on the inspector and facility, and
reported in parentheses.
Table A8: Accounting for Inspector Fatigue: Excluding Inspections Near the
End of a Shift
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.1989*** 1.2799*** 0.1258** 0.1886**
(0.4177) (0.4234) (0.0493) (0.0861)
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4783 0.4597 0.3945 0.4407
N 3,692 3,692 3,692 3,692
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
OLS estimates from routine inspections of restuarants where Firsti,j,t = 1, or Firsti,j,t = 0 and the
inspection began at least 90 minutes before the final inspection of the inspector’s shift.
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Table A9: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance: Restaurants,
Bar/Taverns, Buffets, and Snack Bars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.0172*** 1.0234*** 0.0841*** 0.1986***
(0.2553) (0.2599) (0.0232) (0.0529)
Mean | Firsti,j,t = 0 3.7723 3.8212 0.2397 0.8572
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4765 0.4552 0.3658 0.4307
N 27,975 27,975 27,975 27,975
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates from routine inspections of establishments coded by the SNHD as a: Restaurant,
Bar/Tavern, Buffet, or Snack Bar. Standard errors, clustered two-way on inspector and facility,
are reported in parentheses. The third row of results reports simple averages from the estimating
sample when First = 0.
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Table A10: Inspection Anticipation and Detected Compliance: All Establish-
ment Types
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Demerits Adj. Demerits Critical Violations Major Violations
First 1.0945*** 1.1265*** 0.0966*** 0.2034***
(0.2442) (0.2542) (0.0219) (0.0481)
Mean | Firsti,j,t = 0 3.5781 3.6280 0.2442 0.7852
Establishment FE Y Y Y Y
Starting Hour FE Y Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Inspector FE Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.4745 0.4477 0.3588 0.4326
N 44,816 44,816 44,816 44,816
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates from routine inspections of all establishment types inspected by the SNHD. Standard
errors, clustered two-way on inspector and facility, are reported in parentheses. The third row of
results reports simple averages from the estimating sample when First = 0.
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